High levels of investment in relation to cash flows, combined with high dividend payouts, have caused UK water companies persistently to borrow to meet their cash outflows. This behaviour is not adequately explained by mainstream theories of dividends. The intensive regulatory environment has meant that agency costs and information asymmetry are low, and there was no clear tax motive for the companies' regular dividends. It is argued that the large regular dividends are explained primarily by a demand for dividends on the part of investors, and that there are institutional or behavioural reasons for the demand.
Introduction
Water companies in the UK are large-scale payers of dividends and large-scale borrowers. Two features of the industry mean that the companies' dividend and gearing policies provide unusual evidence on theories of financing. The first is the fact that the industry is regulated. Empirical studies of dividend or gearing policy tend to exclude regulated companies, 'to avoid the criticism that their... decisions are a byproduct of regulation' (Fama & French, 2001, p. 6) . The dividend and gearing policies of UK water companies are not regulated; the regulatory setting affects their policies indirectly, but we treat this as an advantage rather than a problem. The second, more unusual, feature is the fact that the companies' free cash flows have been much smaller than their dividend payments.
These two features are advantageous because they greatly narrow down the range of possible explanations for the companies' behaviour, and so the evidence enables us to establish relatively clearly which theories can explain that behaviour. The evidence supports the view that a demand for dividends exists on the part of investors, a demand which is not primarily motivated by a wish to control agency costs in the relevant companies. It could be more difficult to obtain clear evidence that such a demand exists from the more usual approach of studying a sample of companies with diverse characteristics. Other explanations for dividend payout, such as control of agency costs, are likely to apply in a heterogeneous sample.
The ten regional water authorities in England and Wales were turned into companies in 1989, and their parent companies were floated on the London Stock Exchange. The water companies are closely regulated; the prices they can charge are set by the regulator, they are only allowed to invest in water-related activities, and their operations are scrutinised by the regulator as well as by the stock market. Throughout the period since 1989, the companies' investment expenditure has been nearly as large as their operating cash flows, and much of the investment has been in long-lived assets with low or zero rates of depreciation. So the companies' free cash flows have been small in comparison with their profits, and they have persistently paid out dividends that have been substantially greater than their free cash flows, whether measured before or after interest payments. The result is that they have had to gear up in order to meet their investment expenditure and dividend payments.
The paper argues that mainstream theories of dividend payout do not provide a convincing explanation for why the companies should have paid such large dividends. There was no clear tax advantage to paying dividends, compared with retention of cash. There was a tax advantage to gearing up, at least after the late 1990s, but it is unlikely that the primary motive for the large regular dividends paid by all the companies was to increase debt. The regular dividends were not necessary to gear up, and they prevailed before the time when there was a clear tax benefit to debt. The companies have been willing and able to use large special dividends and share repurchases when they wished to gear up. Turning to non-tax matters, the intensive nature of regulation in the water industry has meant that agency costs are low, and that they would be low without such high payouts. The conclusion that agency costs are low is perhaps surprising, since the companies are natural monopolies, but it is a conclusion supported by substantial evidence. It implies that the primary reason for the large dividends from water companies is not to reduce agency costs, which goes against one of the assumptions underlying the standard life-cycle view of dividend policy. Information asymmetry between the water companies and investors is low, which implies that signalling of private information is unlikely to be the motive for dividend payout. It is also unlikely that the sustained high payouts are due to earnings management by the companies.
Because mainstream theories do not adequately explain the large regular dividends, we argue that their existence is at least roughly consistent with Baker & Wurgler's (2004a) catering theory of dividend policy. According to this theory, there is a demand for dividends on the part of investors, the demand exists mainly for behavioural and institutional reasons, and the strength of the demand varies over time. Baker & Wurgler (2004a , 2004b present US evidence that changes over time in measures of the willingness of firms to be dividend-payers are linked to proxies for changes in investor demand for dividends, especially the log of the difference between the average market-to-book value of payers and non-payers (the 'dividend premium'). Li & Lie (2006) find that increases and decreases in existing dividends are also related to changes in the dividend premium. However, subsequent research on other countries, including the UK, has mainly failed to support the link between willingness to pay and the dividend premium (Denis & Osobov, 2008; Von Eije & Megginson, 2008) , while Hoberg & Prabhala (2009) find that the link disappears in US data once firm risk is introduced as an explanatory variable. Our evidence does not have a bearing on changes over time in the demand for dividends: it indicates simply that there is a persistent demand, that has been strong enough to motivate the large payouts by the UK water companies. The demand is reflected in the size of the payouts, as well as in the fact that the companies are dividendpayers.
Our finding of persistent demand is not apparent in the mixed results to date of tests of the catering theory, which look for changes over time in the demand for dividends. It is possible that there is a demand, and that it does not vary much. Survey and portfolio evidence indicates a strong preference for dividends on the part of certain individual investors (Dong, Robinson & Veld, 2005 , for Dutch individuals; Graham & Kumar, 2006, for US individuals; Brav et al, 2005 , for the views of US managers). The evidence on institutional demand for dividends is less conclusive (for example, Bell & Jenkinson, 2002; Grinstein & Michaely, 2005) .
The paper also provides evidence on debt policy. It is clear that tax management has been important to the companies and their parent groups; they used special dividends and share repurchases explicitly to gear up, and they sought to reduce tax payments via other means. However, each company is required by its operating licence to maintain an investment-grade credit rating, which puts a limit on its gearing. Thus, the evidence supports a simple trade-off view of gearing policy for the water companies, with the limit to gearing in effect set externally. This conclusion might be expected in a setting in which agency and information problems are mitigated by a regulator, but it is still noteworthy that the 'tax saving versus expected costs of financial difficulty' explanation for gearing policy does apply in such a setting. The willingness of water companies to gear up contrasts with the wellknown fact that profitable, unregulated companies tend to have low gearing. We suggest that comparison between normal companies and water companies points to the importance to normal companies of preserving financial flexibility. Normal companies have strategic possibilities denied to the water industry.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information, a summary history of the industry's financial situation, and comments from the histories of the individual water companies. Section 3 relates evidence from the industry to specific theories of dividend and debt policy. Section 4 offers a discussion and conclusions.
The water industry since privatisation
Ten regional water and sewage authorities were created in England and Wales in 1973. These organisations were reconstituted as limited companies in 1989, and each became a subsidiary of a parent company that was floated on the London Stock Exchange via ten concurrent initial public offers (IPOs). The UK government kept a 'golden share' in each parent company to 31 December 1994, to prevent hostile takeover. The ten water and sewage companies accounted for about 75% of water provision and 100% of sewerage provision. The rest of the industry consisted of 29 much smaller water-only businesses which remained as privately owned companies and were not floated on the Stock Exchange. Eighteen of the water-only companies have since been bought, mainly by the water and sewage companies.
Water services in Scotland and Northern Ireland remain in the public sector.
This paper is concerned with the ten companies that were privatised. The regulated companies themselves are only allowed to undertake non-regulated business that is directly related to water, and in all cases the non-regulated business has remained a tiny proportion of their activities. The parent companies are not regulated, and they have been free to expand as they saw fit. After 1994 several water companies were bought by other companies, or, later, by consortia of investment funds. As at 2009, four of the companies were owned by a UKlisted parent, four by an investment consortium, one by a foreign group and one by a not-forprofit company.
Regulation
The water companies are monopoly suppliers of essential services in their respective regions. For this reason they are regulated, by the Water Services Regulation Authority
Ofwat's central objective in the price-setting process is for the return on capital of an efficient company in a given year to be equal to its weighted average cost of capital (WACC)
as estimated by Ofwat. More precisely, at a price review in year t, the real price is set for year t+n with the intention that the operating profit net of tax that can be earned in year t+n, divided by the forecast average regulatory capital value (RCV) during year t+n, is equal to the real WACC for t+n, with the cost of equity expressed net of corporation tax.
which was established when they were privatised. The aims of the regulator are to ensure that the companies can finance their operations, by allowing providers of finance to earn a fair return on capital; to ensure satisfactory and efficient provision of water and sewage services; and to protect the consumer. Ofwat regulates the industry by setting the maximum prices each company is allowed to charge, and by monitoring its operations and quality of service. The prices are set in advance for five years at a time; the price-setting reviews to date have been in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 . Operating profit is defined as sales income for the year, less current cost operating expenditure, less current cost depreciation. RCV is the regulator's measure of the value of capital employed in the regulated company. Since the 1994 price review, RCV has been determined by the company's initial market value on flotation, with upward adjustments in each subsequent year for inflation and for capital expenditure accepted by Ofwat, in excess of current cost depreciation (see Whittington, 1998, for discussion) . As at 2009 the current cost (or modern equivalent asset) value of the ten water companies' assets was approximately £237bn, RCV was £45bn, and the historic cost value was £16bn.
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The above methodology involves forecasting companies' annual sales and their operating and capital expenditures. Only costs and investment considered to be justifiable are accepted for the purpose of setting future prices and calculating each company's allowed RCV going forward. If real operating or capital expenditures turn out persistently to be less than Ofwat's forecast, the company is allowed to keep the gain for five years on a rolling basis, because the expenditures assumed by Ofwat are not adjusted downwards for five years.
It is apparent that the measurement of profit in the water industry will be exceptionally sensitive to the method of valuing the assets and the rules regarding depreciation. We might expect current cost depreciation to be much larger than historic cost depreciation, yet in practice current cost depreciation is similar to historic cost, or a little larger. Ofwat takes the view that profit should be recognised after charging approximately the actual cost of replacing existing assets, including the cost of renewals of underground assets which are not capitalised (Whittington, 1999, p. 236-7) . So presumably current cost depreciation and renewals as measured satisfy this condition. WACC is set in advance at each price review. The same WACC is applied to all ten companies, based on assumptions for the industry as a whole. If the estimated WACC is viewed as fair by investors, and a company's actual rate of return on RCV is approximately the same as the WACC, then the market value of its debt and equity should be approximately the same as its RCV (see Myers and Borucki, 1994 , for a discussion of this).
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The pretax real return on capital and the estimated real pretax WACC since privatisation are shown in Table 1 . During the first five years, prices had been set by the terms of the privatisation, and produced a real return in excess of 12% pa. This was subsequently seen as too generous by Ofwat, the government and others (eg Shaoul, 1997) , and the government imposed a windfall tax on privatised utilities in 1997. Ofwat's first price review
If operating or capital expenditures are higher than Ofwat has forecast, profits are reduced accordingly unless the company can persuade Ofwat to make a subsequent adjustment to prices to recoup the higher-than-assumed costs. These arrangements are intended to provide an incentive for companies to seek efficiencies.
in 1994 aimed to reduce the allowed return on capital to 6.0% pa over the next ten years. The ten-year 'glide path' to 6.0% was abbreviated by the 1999 review, which cut water prices by 12% in nominal terms and brought the industry's returns for the financial years 2000- Ofwat has repeatedly said that it does not regulate the companies' dividend and gearing policies. However, it does monitor and comment on dividends and debt. One of the objectives of price-setting is to ensure that the companies will be able to maintain 'financeability', ie the capacity readily to raise funds. Put briefly, Ofwat views a company's financeability as satisfactory so long as its bonds carry an investment-grade credit rating. A special dividend by the parent is a particularly straightforward payout mechanism, as it does not require any shareholders to sell their shares.
9,10
7 Shaoul (1997, p. 499) states that only 24% of the dividends paid by the water companies up to 1995 were passed on to the parent groups' shareholders. It is hard to see where this number comes from. According to the accounts of each water company and its parent group, the minimum proportion passed on during 1990-91 to 1994-95 was 39% (Wessex Water plc) and the average was 69%.
The acceptance of substantial 8 For the water industry the windfall tax was £1,923m in total (Beekes, 2003b) , payable by the parent companies in two instalments, in December 1997 and 1998. 9 Ofwat's view is that 'the regulated companies are expected to adopt appropriate and sustainable dividend policies. We have suggested that such a dividend policy should comply with two principles. These are that the company's ability to finance its regulated business should not be impaired; and, under a system of incentive regulation, dividends reward efficiency and the management of economic risk ' (FPE 2004-05, p. 36) . 10 Lobina & Hall (2001, p. 11) suggest that in the 1990s several companies cut their investment programmes in order to protect their dividends. But the more usual worry is that the industry has had incentives to try to invest too much (eg Glaister, 1996; Cave, 2009 ). See also Section 3.3.
dividend payout as perfectly normal for a water company is consistent with the greater importance of dividends in valuing utility companies compared with other companies, as perceived both by analysts (Barker, 1999) and executives (Dhanani, 2005) . Gearing policies have been somewhat more varied than dividend policies. All the companies followed the same general policy of increasing gearing until the mid-or late-
2000s, but at different speeds, and in some cases with several consecutive years of no increase.
Water companies and theories of dividend payout and gearing
We now compare evidence from the industry with the assumptions and predictions of theories of dividends and gearing. The aim is to see which theories best explain the evidence, starting with tax-based explanations.
Dividends and tax
Until 1999 an imputation system was in force in the UK. Under the imputation system, companies paid Advance Corporation Tax (ACT) on their dividends several months before any remaining, 'mainstream', corporation tax fell due, and shareholders received dividends net of ACT. Both the ACT rate and the full corporation tax rate varied somewhat; for the financial years 1994-96, for example, the ACT rate was 20% and the corporation tax rate was 33%. ACT also counted as income tax at the basic rate. This meant that only individuals subject to the higher rate of income tax (40% throughout our period) had to pay any further tax on dividends. Tax-exempt shareholders were able to reclaim ACT from the Inland Revenue which had been paid by the companies. Much the most important beneficiaries of the reclaim were UK pension funds, which owned about 34% of listed UK company shares during the early to mid-1990s. 11 Life assurance companies, which owned about 25% of UK shares, were also able to set some of the ACT against other tax payable by the life office, or to reclaim some of the ACT.
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ACT was paid by the parent group, not the water company, on dividends paid to shareholders of the parent. In effect, dividends paid by a water company to its parent were gross of the ACT incurred by the parent. Amounts paid out via share repurchases and special dividends also attracted ACT.
From July 1997 pension funds ceased to be able to reclaim ACT, and in 1999 ACT was abolished altogether. Since then a classical tax system has been in force, with a zero rate of income tax on dividends for all categories of UK investor except higher-tax-bracket individuals.
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There was a problem with ACT that was highly relevant to the parent groups of water companies. The amount of ACT that could be offset against corporation tax in a given year was limited to a fraction of the current corporation tax due for that year. The fraction was the prevailing ACT rate divided by the rate of corporation tax, for example 20/33 during 1994-96.
Any 'surplus' ACT, that could not be used to offset corporation tax in the year the ACT was paid, could be carried back for up to six years, or carried forwards indefinitely. There were rules about how much surplus ACT could be 'relieved' by setting it against corporation tax in another year; a dividend-paying company carrying forward surplus ACT could still have paid substantial corporation tax (Melville, 1999, p. 400) . The present value of the tax reduction from setting ACT against corporation tax diminished the longer surplus ACT was carried forward without being relieved. So companies with unrelieved ACT incurred a higher effective rate of corporation tax than they would have incurred had they paid out smaller dividends in years that gave rise to surplus ACT.
For example, suppose that a company pays a dividend at date t, and pays ACT on the dividend at a rate of 20%. The ACT is surplus when it is paid, and the company is unable to 11 Source for ownership estimates: Financial Statistics, published monthly by the Office for National Statistics. 12 The tax regime for life offices is complicated. For a brief explanation, see Armitage (2004) . 13 The payment of ACT on repurchases and special dividends is mentioned in the annual reports of North West Water Group plc , Southern Water plc , Severn Trent plc (1997-98) and Wessex Water plc . So repurchases were treated as income for shareholders rather than capital gains, as regards payment of ACT.
relieve the ACT for ten years. Let the discount rate be 5% pa (a nominal rate should be used, as the unrelieved ACT carried forward is a nominal amount). Then the present value at date t of the reduction in corporation tax when the ACT is finally relieved at date t+10 is £0.61 per £1.00 of ACT paid. The payment of the dividend at date t, coupled with the company's inability to relieve the ACT for ten years, means that the company paid tax on the dividend at date t at an effective rate of 20% × (1 -0.61) = 7.8%, which would have been avoided had the company not paid the dividend.
The problem for the water parent groups was that they had been paying large dividends in the 1990s, and paying ACT on those dividends, but they had approximately zero taxable profits until 1995-96 at the earliest. The reason was capital allowances, ie accelerated depreciation of capital expenditure for the purpose of calculating taxable profit. The terms of the privatisation enabled water companies to claim capital allowances on existing assets to a value of £7.7bn (National Audit Office, 1992, pp. 20-1), and, in addition, continued high investment gave the companies new allowances. In order to reduce surplus ACT, all the parent groups started to offer a scrip (share) alternative to cash dividends at some time during the 1990s, because dividends paid in shares did not attract ACT.
14 At least six parent groups had accumulated substantial amounts of unrelieved ACT by 31 March 2000, which were being carried forward as a deferred asset to set against future tax (see Appendix).
The earliest year a company introduced scrip dividends was 1991-92, the latest was 1997-98, and the terms offered also varied; some companies offered scrip dividends at a substantial premium, ie the scrip was worth more than the cash alternative. All the scrip dividends were discontinued after ACT was abolished.
15 Anglian Water plc had unrelieved ACT of £158m, and in 2009 the group was still carrying forward unrelieved ACT of £143m.
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relieved their ACT soon after 2000 by electing to defer their claims for some capital allowances, which increased their current corporation tax charge. However, this tactic would not necessarily have gained the groups much, as deferring capital allowances reduces the present value of the tax saved by the allowances.
Pension funds could still reclaim all the ACT paid on dividends they received up to July 1997, whether it was surplus ACT or not. So there was still a tax advantage to paying dividends to pensions funds, though the tax advantage was smaller if the ACT was surplus when it was paid. After 1997 pension funds were indifferent between dividends and capital gains, paying no tax on either. Other categories of shareholder paid no UK personal tax on dividends either before or after ACT was abolished in 1999, beyond the ACT that was paid by the companies. The exception was individuals facing the higher rate of income tax. Highertax-bracket individuals paid additional income tax at a rate of 25% of the dividend as received, net of ACT, and 22.5% of the dividend after 1999. The additional rate applied to income from shares owned both directly and indirectly via mutual funds and trusts (but not to shares owned indirectly via pension funds and life assurance funds). Effective rates of capital gains tax (CGT) were very low because there were several means by which CGT could be avoided. Armitage (2004) provides a description of personal taxes on financial assets in the UK, together with estimates of effective rates of tax on dividends and of CGT.
Given the ability of pension funds to reclaim ACT, and the fact that the shares of water groups offered a high dividend yield, pension funds might have been expected to own disproportionately large holdings in these shares, ie holdings in excess of the 34% of UK shares in general that pension funds owned. Unfortunately there is little direct evidence on this. The annual report of Thames Water plc for 1991-92 records that pension funds owned 40.2% of the shares (p. 48; some of the pension funds may have been non-UK funds). This estimate suggests that the tax-induced 'clientele effect' of disproportionate pension-fund ownership was fairly small. 17 some corporation tax. The system continued for unrelieved ACT after ACT itself was abolished. Anglian Water's parent surrendered its unrelieved ACT to Anglian Water Services Ltd, but AWS paid insufficient tax in the 2000s for much of the ACT to be relieved. 17 Bell & Jenkinson (2002) argue from ex-dividend day evidence that pension funds were price-setting investors in high-yield shares. But the ex-day evidence suggests that, for shares in all yield categories, the market value of a dividend was less than its cash value (net of ACT), before and after 1997. This implies that the price-setting investor paid some personal tax on dividends. If pension funds set prices, the market value of the dividend should have exceeded its cash value before 1997. Armitage, Hodgkinson & Partington (2006) provide evidence on the market value of UK dividends using an alternative methodology. They find that market value exceeded cash value both before and after 1997, with no evidence for a tax-clientele effect in high-yield shares.
The result of the imputation system up to 1997 was that, regarding shares owned by pension funds, there was a tax advantage to dividends over retention and capital gains, despite the problem of surplus ACT. The position was unclear for life funds. For other shareholders, who could not reclaim any ACT, there was a tax disadvantage to payout by companies with surplus ACT, assuming that CGT could be avoided. High-tax-bracket individuals definitely preferred capital gains, unless they were unable to avoid CGT. From 1999 the problem of surplus ACT disappeared, but pension funds, charities and life funds had lost the right to reclaim any corporation tax. Overall, the tax regime was approximately neutral with respect to dividend payout throughout the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . There was arguably a tax advantage to payout before 1997 for UK companies in general, but the scale of unrelieved ACT for most of the water companies makes it doubtful whether there was a tax advantage to payout for these companies.
Debt and tax
Tax advantage to debt. The extent of the tax advantage has varied over time. The companies only started paying some current tax from the later 1990s. Since then, they have made cash payments of corporation tax at rates well below the statutory rate (28% in . The main reason is that they have benefited from capital allowances.
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The tax benefit from additional borrowing by a company depends partly on when the extra interest will save tax. If a company has surplus capital allowances available for a given year -ie allowances in excess of those required to reduce taxable profit to zero -the surplus can be carried forward to reduce taxable profit in a future year. But this reduces the present value of the tax saved by the allowances, and so the allowances should be used to reduce taxable profit as soon as possible. The water companies knew they would have surplus allowances for the first seven or eight years of their existence, even if they had no debt.
Some groups have also been to able reduce their tax payments by setting losses arising in non-regulated parts of the group against the taxable profits of the regulated company ('group relief' for losses). Gearing up during this period meant that more of the allowances were carried forward for several years before they could be used, which reduced the tax saving from the interest.
The comments so far ignore personal tax: they assume implicitly that the effective personal tax rates on debt and equity are the same, so that there is always a tax advantage to debt so long as borrowing saves corporation tax at any rate exceeding zero. The effective personal tax rates on debt and equity are hard to estimate, because different types of investor face different rates of personal tax. One approach is to estimate an average personal tax rate weighted by holdings per tax category of investor. On this basis, the tax rate on interest was about 10% and on dividends net of ACT it was about -8% (ie a reclaim on average) during 1990-97, according to Armitage (2004) . From 1997 the tax rate on dividends net of ACT was nearer to zero, and from 1999 it was approximately zero. The tax rate on interest remained around 10%. So there was personal-tax disadvantage to debt of around 18% before 1997, and more like 10% afterwards. This ignores the returns to equity via capital gains.
Overall, there was no clear tax advantage to debt for water companies before the late 1990s, allowing both for personal tax and for the reduced tax saving from interest during the 1990s. But it is plausible that managers thought that there was a tax advantage, albeit at a reduced level because the companies were not paying corporation tax at the time (survey evidence indicates that managers largely ignore personal tax, eg Graham & Harvey, 2001; Beattie, Goodacre & Thomson, 2006) . After the imputation system was abolished, and after the companies started to pay corporation tax, it is likely that there has been a tax advantage to debt, even allowing for personal tax.
All the companies borrowed from the outset, and in the 2000s most of the water companies paid one or more special dividends in order to increase their gearing. Ofwat has supported gearing up, so long as financeability has remained assured. The speed and extent of the companies' gearing up has varied. Six of the them appear to have been undergeared during much of the 2000s; they had several years in a row when their gearing was well below 70%, and when they paid substantial amounts of corporation tax (see Appendix; 70% is taken to be the maximum consistent with an investment-grade credit rating Risk of financial distress. Lenders, rating agencies, companies and Ofwat all view default on debt as a genuine possibility; the water companies do not enjoy an explicit or implicit government guarantee. If a company were to be unable to meet its obligations, an administrator would be appointed who would ensure that its core services are maintained, but the existing shareholders and lenders could lose money in the ensuing re-structuring.
Maintenance of an investment-grade credit rating is a condition of each company's licence to operate, and all the companies have retained such a rating to date. A level of gearing high enough to jeopardise the rating is clearly not viewed as worthwhile. US survey evidence indicates the importance of credit ratings to unregulated firms as well (Graham & Harvey, 2001, p. 211 
Agency costs and regulatory control of expenditure
Water companies. The academic literature views reduction of free cash as a first-order motive for dividends, because it reduces potential agency costs. Empire-building managers desire growth for its own sake, and can invest free cash to increase the size of the business beyond the size at which enterprise value is maximised. Managers seeking an easy life will not control costs vigorously, and are under less pressure to control costs if the company has free cash. We argue that there was little reason, from an agency perspective, for water companies to have paid out more than their free cash flows. This is because the intensive nature of regulation in the industry means that the regulator has been effective in controlling agency costs. The process of setting prices five years in advance means that the regulator makes explicit projections of reasonable operating costs and levels of investment, and then monitors company performance against these projections. About one year before the final determinations are published, each regulated company submits a business plan for the next five years. Managers seeking growth for its own sake, or seeking an easy life, will tend to submit exaggerated forecasts of future operating costs and necessary investment.
Furthermore, shareholders have no incentive to constrain managers' forecasts, so long as the WACC estimated by Ofwat is considered to be fair or better. Operating costs accepted by
Ofwat will be covered in the prices charged to customers, and investment accepted will add to the capital base on which the company can earn the estimated WACC. Shareholders do lose, however, if managers spend more than the expenditure allowed by Ofwat for price-setting. Performance on leakage has become the yardstick in the UK press for water-company competence, and progress on leakage features prominently on company websites and in annual reports. Each price review also contains much discussion regarding the potential for future efficiency gains in both operations and undertaking investment, and each review has refined the incentives to promote efficiency. Whittington (1999, pp. 229-37) believes that the development of Ofwat's knowledge about the companies and expertise in monitoring has been a long-term process lasting ten years or more.
One way of judging the stringency of Ofwat's projected operating and capital expenditures, allowed in the price reviews, is by comparing the projections with companies' actual expenditures. This is done in the FPE reports. The comparisons reveal that the actual and projected expenditures are similar; there is no tendency for companies to 'empire-build' via overspending in relation to Ofwat's projections. Similarly, the return on capital achieved has been in line with, or a little below, the estimated WACC (Table 1 ). This suggests that, for the industry as a whole, Ofwat's price limits and expenditure projections have not been too generous from the shareholders' perspective, leaving aside the question of whether the estimated WACC was fair.
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There are a few econometric studies that examine the efficiency of the water industry following privatisation. Erbetta & Cave (2007) find that the mix of inputs (allocative efficiency) improved between 1993 and 2005, as the industry became more capital-intensive.
But there was little improvement in the use of resources to produce a specified output The 1999 price review, which mandated a substantial cut in prices, was undoubtedly regarded as severe by the companies and by some commentators. For example, the Lex column of the Financial Times described water-company managers as 'worn down by an oppressive regulatory regime' (9 April 2001). However, this type of evidence on its own does not rule out the possibility that Ofwat was 'captured' by company managers: they may have persuaded the regulator to allow expenditures that were higher than would have been necessary in a truly efficient company, and to set prices accordingly.
The Cave Report (2009) is a major government-sponsored study of the water industry.
The report notes that promotion of efficiency is almost entirely driven by Ofwat; capitalmarket pressure from investors and lenders is not mentioned. Its conclusion regarding Ofwat is that the regulator has done a good job in controlling costs, but that the regulatory and market structures within which the industry operates could be improved, in order to provide more incentive for efficiency-promoting investment. The report suggests that there is a bias towards seeking investment in general (if it is accepted by Ofwat), because this expands the RCV, but also that there is a bias against investment which produces benefits mainly beyond the five-year horizon during which companies are allowed to keep the benefits of efficiency improvements. It is argued that water companies should have more incentive to be innovative, and to look beyond their regions of operation to meet future challenges from climate change and population growth. Measures to introduce some forms of competition are recommended, such as bidding for operating licences and provision for trading water. The standard explanation for why customer-owned organisations (mutuals) exist is that there must be special features of the organisation in question to set against the lack of shareholders and the monitoring benefits they provide, so that the agency costs if the organisation is a mutual are at least as low as they would be if it were a joint-stock company (Fama & Jensen, 1983 ). Glas Cymru is not a customer-owned mutual, but it lacks shareholders and a profit motive. The implication of the conversion is that water, as regulated, is a business in which pressure from shareholders is not needed for agency costs to be low, otherwise the not-forprofit constitution would not be viable. The main special feature of water that makes the notfor-profit constitution a low-agency-cost arrangement is surely the presence of an effective regulator.
The conclusions from the above evidence are as follows. The figures in Table 1 show that the companies could have accumulated free cash by not paying any dividends. But they would not have been able to invest the cash to increase RCV any faster than was already allowed. Persistent investment in excess of Ofwat's projections, ie negative-NPV investment, would have been publicised in the FPE reports and would have attracted criticism from Ofwat, analysts and shareholders. There has been no suggestion from any quarter that the operating costs or investment accepted by Ofwat in its projections have been excessive. This is a very different environment from that of a normal, unregulated company, and it is an environment that makes value-destroying empire building exceptionally difficult.
The evidence regarding the other potential agency problem, managers' lack of diligence, is less conclusive. The Cave Report suggests that the industry's performance since privatisation has been disappointing in increasing operating efficiency and in being innovative. However, Ofwat has not been criticised for being ineffective in its monitoring of operating costs, nor generally for being too 'soft' on companies. In Cave's view, the main reason for the lack of innovation is that the regulatory framework does not enable companies to benefit sufficiently from being innovative.
The dividends that are retained. In fact, though, the bulk of both the regular and special dividend payments from the regulated companies has been passed on to shareholders, or has been used to pay the windfall tax, as documented in Table 2 . Because most of the dividends have been passed on to shareholders by parent companies, empire-building by parents cannot be the primary explanation for the high dividends of the regulated companies.
Some parent companies did fund expansion in part via retention of dividends from their regulated business, and Ofwat initially judged that, as a result, some water companies 'have paid dividends to their parent company which do not reflect the sustainable dividend that might have been paid had the [company] been a freestanding plc' (Ofwat, 1993, p. 33) .
The regulator's view at the time did not in general lead to lower payouts by water companies, and it was not a view that was repeated subsequently. It might be the case that a motive for shareholder pressure for large dividend payouts by parent groups was to prevent empire-building by parents, given large payouts to parents by their water companies. But pressure on parents to pay out the dividends they receive does not explain why the water companies paid high dividends in the first place.
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In any case, the issue of parent groups has receded in recent years. Many of the nonwater businesses have been divested, and seven of the water companies are now either owned as stand-alone entities by investment consortia, or they comprise more than 90% of the parent group. The three exceptions are South West Water, owned by Pennon Group which has built up a large waste-management operation; United Utilities Water, part of a group which is also a major supplier of water-related services through outsourcing contracts; and Wessex Water, owned by YTL Power International, of Malaysia. The reversion to stand-alone water companies in the 2000s has been associated with increased dividend payout, at least as measured by dividend cover.
Theories based on information asymmetry
Signalling. Another prominent hypothesis to explain dividend payout is that dividends are a costly positive signal about the firm's prospects. Dividend policy is used to convey private information about the firm's future that cannot credibly be communicated to the stock market in other ways. The cost of false signalling arises because a level of payout which is greater than the firm can afford leads to a higher probability of costs in the future, for example, costs of financial distress. If we assume that managers are seeking to maximise equity value, a company will only increase payouts if the managers believe the additional risk of financial distress to be sufficiently small. So a decision to increase payouts implies that the managers believe the company's future cash flows will be high enough that distress is unlikely, given the higher payouts.
The signalling motive is surely weak in the water industry. A water company's profits are determined primarily by the regulator, and an exceptionally large proportion of valuerelevant information is in the public domain, as a result of the regulatory process. It is not plausible that the water companies chose their consistently high levels of payout to convey private information about their future prospects. In addition, despite the high profile of 23 Smith (1986) suggests that regulated companies pay high dividends to ensure that they have to raise equity from time to time, which is beneficial because raising equity exposes them to extra scrutiny. There have been several share issues by parent groups, which might have been avoided had their payouts been smaller. But in most cases the proceeds were not invested in the water company. The only exceptions have been the issues by United Utilities in 2003 and 2005 . The scrutiny-from-shareissues hypothesis can help explain high payouts by the parents, but not by the water companies.
signalling theories of dividends, the bulk of the evidence does not support signalling (Allen & Michaely, 2003; Denis & Osobov, 2008; Li & Zhao, 2008) .
The signalling and agency theories, and the life-cycle view to an extent, assume implicitly that the shares are widely held by 'outsiders' who are not as well informed as managers, and who have limited incentive and means to control agency costs in the company.
The catering theory as presented by Baker & Wurgler (2004a) also assumes this setting, though there is no particular reason why demand for dividends should be confined to investors in widely held companies. We have seen that levels of payout have continued unaffected when a water company has become wholly owned by a foreign parent or by an investment consortium. This does not sit easily with the signalling, agency, or life-cycle theories, according to which there is reduced justification for payout by a company with a single owner, compared with the same company with widely held shares.
The signalling motive could be more important for financial firms, which are sometimes considered together with utilities because they are regulated and they tend to pay large dividends (for example, in Dhanani, 2005) . But financial firms are more opaque than water companies, and they are regulated in a less intensive way, which does not normally include direct control of the prices they can charge.
Pecking order. The prediction of the pecking-order theory is that companies should finance themselves with retained cash, if possible, to avoid the costs of raising debt or, worse, equity. The theory is based on an assumption of asymmetric information, which is what makes it problematic for firms to raise external funds at a fair expected rate of return. External funding also entails transactions costs. Water companies are relatively transparent and easy to value, because of the regulatory process and the nature of the industry. So the pecking-order theory would be expected to apply with relatively low force to water companies.
The theory is about how a company funds itself, not about dividend payout, as Fama & French (2005) point out. However, the payouts of the water companies have had a huge impact on how they funded themselves. The companies could have funded themselves without any borrowing, had their dividends been substantially lower. In this respect, the pecking-order theory fails to explain their behaviour. On the other hand, the theory predicts that shares issues are a last resort, and there have only been two share issues by a water company since privatisation.
Life-cycle theory of dividends
The life-cycle view results from a combination of other ideas; the information costs and transactions costs of equity issues and financial distress encourage retention of free cash flow, while agency costs encourage payout. The benefits of payout compared with retention grow as firms mature; their free cash flows tend to grow, and their investment opportunities diminish. DeAngelo & DeAngelo (2006) argue that the 'default setting' for companies should be to pay out surplus cash. Though the timing of the payouts does not matter, so long as cash retained is invested at fair rates of return, cash retained and never paid out to shareholders reduces shareholder value. Dividend policy is not irrelevant so long as managers have a feasible alternative to (eventual) full payout of free cash, the alternative being to divert retained cash to themselves or others.
Evidence on the characteristics of dividend payers is consistent with a life-cycle view. Fama & French (2001) compare US companies that pay a dividend with companies that do not pay. The dividend payers are on average about ten times larger, with higher profitability and lower investment opportunities, proxied by growth in assets or market value of assets divided book value. DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Stulz (2006) use retained earnings divided by total equity, and retained earnings divided by total assets, as more focused proxies for a company's stage in its life cycle. They find that these variables have additional power in explaining which companies pay dividends, over and above the explanatory variables in Fama & French (2001) .
Regulated utilities fit the life-cycle theory well, as do the UK water companies at first glance. The latter are long-established and profitable operations, and they have no opportunities for investment beyond what is allowed by the regulator. They can borrow readily, avoiding the need for expensive share issues, and the risk of financial distress is low.
But, for some reason, the water companies have brought forward from the future substantial payouts of free cash flows, and the life-cycle view cannot explain this. The example of the water industry shows that actually having the free cash flows today is not a necessary condition for dividend payout. We suggest that the companies' policy was possible because managers, shareholders and lenders believed that the companies' long-term future income streams were sufficiently certain, 24 24 The fact that they are low-risk is consistent with the view that risk is an important determinant of willingness to pay a dividend (Chay & Suh, 2009; Hoberg & Prabhala, 2009 ). However, this view does not explain why the water companies' dividends should have been so large.
and because they were not expected to have significant investment opportunities in the future beyond the investment allowed by Ofwat. These two circumstances meant that the policy of persistently paying dividends using borrowed money was probably not seen as destroying value either by exposing the companies to undue risk, or by limiting their future flexibility. But that explains only why the policy was not a bad one, not why it was the best policy.
Earnings management and dividends
Water companies have an incentive to manipulate their earnings downwards, especially before and during price reviews, in order to help persuade the regulator to allow higher prices in future. McInnes (1990 McInnes ( , 2002 investigates methods that have been deployed by state-owned utility companies to reduce their profits, to justify higher prices. In a test for earnings management at water and electricity companies, Beekes (2003a) finds evidence of downward manipulation of earnings by the water industry in 1994-05, the financial year during which the first price review was conducted. However, Beekes (2003b) finds no evidence of earnings management by water companies in 1996-97, the year preceding the windfall tax.
Though water companies might have manipulated their profits at times, it is unlikely that such behaviour can explain their dividend policies. A normal episode of earnings management has an impact for one or a few years, which subsequently reverses. What we are trying to explain is high dividend payouts for 20 years. The main way to manipulate earnings over many years is via the valuation of assets and depreciation policies. For example, British
Gas Corporation switched to current cost depreciation in 1977, which increased accounting costs for at least the next ten years (McInnes, 2002) . Manipulation of this nature by water companies would be very difficult. Ofwat determines how both the amount of RCV and the amount of depreciation are to be estimated, for the purpose of estimating a company's return on capital. In addition, the companies' incentive for the purpose of influencing Ofwat is to manipulate earnings downwards, but if earnings management is to be part of the explanation for high payout, presumably earnings should be manipulated upwards.
Water companies produce both current and historic cost accounts are produced. The incentives discussed are for current cost depreciation to be managed upwards, to reduce the current cost profit that Ofwat uses, and for historic cost depreciation to be managed downwards, to increase reported profits and justify high dividends. Such manipulation would make the difference between current and historic cost depreciation larger than it would otherwise be, but as noted in Section 2.1, the difference between current and historic cost depreciation is surprisingly small, compared with the large difference between current and historic cost asset value.
Demand for dividends
We have argued that the theories considered so far do not provide a satisfactory explanation for the persistent high payouts by water companies. In this section we propose that the regular dividends, at least, have been paid because the owners of the parent groups have expected the companies to pay large regular dividends. Were a company not to pay such dividends without a good reason (for example, because payment might threaten the company's credit rating), the managers would come under pressure, or perhaps be required, to increase payout. The pressure would come from mainly institutional investors in the case of a UK-listed parent, or from the management of a foreign parent company, or from the members of a private investment consortium. The water companies' behaviour is to some extent explained by a life-cycle view in which mature companies should pay out their free cash flows. But the water companies have been paying out far more than their free cash flows. We argue that this evidence supports the second version of the Baker-Wurgler catering theory, that there is investor demand for dividends that managers feel obliged to meet. However, the demand has been not merely for some dividends, with the level of payout a second-order matter: the demand has been for large payouts, that required borrowing to fund them. There was a tax advantage to debt, at least from the late 1990s, and so the desire to gear up is a possible motive for the large payouts.
Nearly 30% of the payouts have been in the form of a special dividend from the water company, matched approximately by a concurrent share repurchase by the parent, a special dividend, or a payment of windfall tax. The exceptional payouts in the 2000s, if not before, have been made primarily in order to gear up, as stated by the companies, and gearing up is recognised in the literature as one of the motives for repurchases (Dittmar, 2000) . We argue that the primary reason for the large regular dividends, though, was to satisfy investor demand. Parent groups could easily have geared up by means of exceptional payouts, without paying regular dividends at all. None of the groups ever said that they were paying regular dividends in order to gear up. All parties expected them to pay large regular dividends because this was seen as the appropriate policy in its own right, not because the companies needed to gear up and regular dividends were required in order to do so. Payouts were high during the early and mid-1990s, but the tax benefit from debt was reduced because the companies were not paying corporation tax, and allowing for personal tax, there was probably no tax benefit during these years.
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Our conclusion is consistent with the view that dividend payout is positively related to the quality of corporate governance and protection of shareholder rights (for example, Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010) . 26 The evidence for low agency costs suggests that corporate governance arrangements are good in the water industry, as well as that the regulator is effective. The owners' wishes are relatively easy to enforce when the owner is an investment consortium, but even when the parent group has been a listed company with no controlling shareholder, the groups have proved responsive to pressure for dividends from their shareholders.
Conclusion
For twenty years, UK water companies have paid out dividends substantially in excess of their cash flows net of interest. We have argued that there is no convincing explanation for such high payouts to be found from the menu of tax, agency, signalling, pecking-order or lifecycle reasons that are standard in the finance literature, and that they are not a result of attempts to manage earnings. Rather, we argue that the water industry provides clear evidence of investor demand for dividends, and that the primary reason for this demand is not to reduce agency costs in the regulated companies. The companies are seen by investors and analysts as natural payers of substantial dividends in relation to profits, even though they lack the cash flows to make such payments. Recent levels of payout, with industry dividend cover hovering around 1.0 times, have been so high that they are unlikely to be sustainable, given the industry's projected investment and the limited scope for further increases in gearing.
Our evidence supports the view that there is a demand for substantial dividends from companies of a certain type, namely mature companies that normally have substantial free cash flows, as in the life-cycle theory. We are not suggesting that professional investors demand dividends from all types of company.
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Although we do not view tax as the driving force behind the regular dividends, the industry provides evidence that tax matters to companies. The water groups made clear efforts to reduce tax payments, efforts which included offering scrip dividends to reduce ACT in the 1990s, the use of exceptional payouts to increase borrowing, and other tactics (see Appendix).
At the same time, the water companies and Ofwat have been very concerned that the companies retain investment-grade credit ratings, and this limits the levels of gearing that they will tolerate. So the gearing policies of the water companies can be explained by the traditional trade-off theory of gearing, ie tax savings are compared with the increased risk of financial distress.
The contribution from our evidence in relation to the life-cycle theory is that the demand clearly exists even when the reason for the demand is unlikely to be reduction of agency costs in the relevant company. Therefore, the paper adds to the evidence that supports the importance of institutional, clientele and behavioural explanations for the existence of large regular dividends. The contribution in relation to Baker & Wurgler's (2004a) catering theory is that, in the case of water companies at least, the demand for dividends has been persistent over 20 years; it has varied neither over time, nor with type of owner. In addition, the size of the payout has been very important, not just the fact that the water companies have been dividend-payers. Further research on the underlying reasons for the demand for dividends seems worthwhile, in particular on the demand on the part of investing institutions, including specialist funds such as infrastructure funds.
The case throws light on the well-attested finding of a negative relationship between profitability and gearing in normal, unregulated companies. The puzzle is that, with modest gearing-up, the increased present value of the cost of financial distress appears to be small compared with the present value of the tax savings available (Graham, 2000, though qualified by Blouin, Core & Guay, 2010) . The water companies have been reliably profitable and they have all been willing to gear up considerably. What is the difference between a water company and a normal large, profitable but ungeared company, that might explain the dramatic difference in their gearing policies? One difference lies in the water companies' lack of sufficient free cash flows to pay their regular dividends. But the companies paid special dividends in order to gear up faster than was required to pay the regular dividends, implying that they had a genuine desire to gear up that is absent in many unregulated profitable companies. Another possible difference is that the water companies are more transparent than normal companies, and so the 'information cost' of external capital is less. The argument here is that if a normal company gears up, it might need to raise equity, which would have more severe information and transaction costs than raising debt.
Differences that are more clear are the lack of investment opportunities in the regulated water industry, beyond the investment allowed by the regulator, and the very low level of business risk. In deciding a company's level of gearing, company managers say that retaining financial flexibility is of first-order importance (Graham & Harvey, 2001) ; in the UK survey of Beattie, Goodacre & Thomson (2006) , 'ensuring long term survivability' is top of the list. Retaining flexibility is valuable when future opportunities are uncertain, and when a downturn in the business might arise. So financial flexibility could be much more valuable to many unregulated companies than to water companies. It would be worth exploring further how the value of flexibility affects gearing policy.
Appendix: information about individual companies
This appendix provides the following information. 2004/5 to 05/6 Cash dividends paid. Repurchases 1996 Repurchases , 1999 Repurchases , 2003 Repurchases , 2007 .
Gearing of water company
1990/1 to 01/2 Steady increase from 16% to 53%. The data relate to financial years ending on 31 March. The financial amounts are adjusted for inflation and are expressed in 2009 pounds. The figures are calculated from data in FPE, except for interest reported for the years 1991-94, which is not in the early FPEs, and for corporation tax paid in cash. These data are from company annual reports. The smaller wateronly companies are excluded; for this reason the data in the table do not match the data in the summary tables in FPE. The 'average' column at the far right shows the (equally-weighted) averages of the numbers for each year.
Operating cash flow: cash flow gross of capital expenditure, tax, interest and dividends, excluding proceeds from sales of non-financial assets, income from financial assets and cash flows relating to financing. Capital expenditure: also a cash flow item, it includes expenditure on both maintenance and new infrastructure. For the following ratios, the table shows equally weighted averages across the companes. Dŵr Cymru is excluded from 2001 for calculating dividend cover and shortfall. Div cover: historic cost operating profit after tax divided by total dividends (declared up to 2003-04; cash flow dividends from 2004-05). Shortfall: all divs: total dividends less net cash flow after interest, divided by operating cash flow. This ratio shows the funds required to be raised to make the dividend payouts, as a proportion of the operating cash flow. Shortfall: reg divs: as for 'shortfall: all divs', but counting only regular dividends. Gearing: debt at year-end net of holdings of financial assets, divided by RCV for the relevant year. Int cover: operating cash flow divided by interest.
Estimated WACC: the WACC set for the next five years by Ofwat in the price reviews of 1994, 1999 and 2004, expressed 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Gearing -7% 16% 28% 29% 25% 29% 31% 39% 45% 46% 49% 55% 62% 64% 64% 62% 65% 67% 72% 44% Int cover (times) 13.9 8.5 6.5 7.7 10.9 9.1 9.1 7.5 6.2 5.5 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.8 4.3 3.9 4.0 6.3
Estimated WACC Not set Decline to 6.0% over 10 years 6.5% 6.5% 6.5% 6.5% 6.5% 7.3% 7.3% 7.4% 7.3% Actual return 12.1% 12.8% 12.6% 12.2% 12.1% 11.4% 10.9% 10.1% 9.6% 9.3% 6.6% 6.5% 5.9% 5.8% 5.8% 6.5% 6.4% 6.5% 6.8% ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Table 2 Payouts of individual water companies Four measures are shown for each period in which the water company had the same ownership, counting a UK listed parent as a single owner. A period under new ownership includes the financial year in which the change occurred. For example, the period for the new owner of a company bought on 1 December 2000 would start from the financial year ending 31 March 2001. Shortfall: all dividends: total dividend payouts in a given period less net cash flows after interest, divided by operating cash flows. All amounts used are in 2009 pounds. Shortfall: regular dividends: as for shortfall: all dividends, but counting only regular dividends. Dividend cover: average over the given period of the yearly historic cost profit after tax divided by total dividends. Prop'n paid out by parent: total payouts by the parent group over the period, including windfall tax and ACT, but not including any other corporation tax, divided by dividend payouts by the water company. Shows the extent to which the parent group passed on to shareholders the water company's payouts. The figure might overstate the proportion paid out, as it ignores any dividends paid to the parent by other group companies. It is not calculated if the parent is a foreign company, because the dividend policy of a foreign company might not be comparable with the policy of UK companies. Companies owned by investment consortia pay their dividends to a holding company and are taken as paying 100% of their dividends to the consortium. Sources: FPE and annual reports of parent groups. Note: all the water companies paid cash dividends on their ordinary shares every year, except as noted in the 1993 -94 and 1994 -95. In 1993 Ofwat had questioned the large payouts by some water companies that were partly retained by parent groups. 4 Not calculated because the company was owned by a foreign group. 5 Not calculated because the water company was only a small proportion of the group. 6 Figures for this period are shown separately because the parent was a substantially larger group after 1995. The proportion paid out is biased upwards because the water company was less than 50% of the group from 1995 until 2007. 
